There are two different versions of the theory of interest, which correspond to the above-mentioned issue of the rule of rights. The question here is whether there are fundamental aspects of rights that are exclusive, or at least more important in legal systems, as opposed to morality. Of the four basic types of rights that Hohfeld purported to identify, immunities pose problems, albeit somewhat different. Immunity arises when Y is not entitled to change X`s legal position. But is immunity itself a right, or is it simply a means of protecting a right, that is, by shielding it from deletion or modification? As with the powers, views diverged. Dworkin (1973, 1975, 1981, 1986) was a representative of the first point of view in a formulation of his legal theory. Consequently, rights have a categorical primacy over any other consideration that is not itself legally justified. Of course, it is true in many legal systems that constitutional rights, or some of them, should take precedence over any other consideration that does not itself flow from a constitutional right. But this seems to be mainly due to the constitutional status of the law. Both in law and morality, many rights are rather trivial. In morality, these rights can sometimes even be justified by considerations of personal comfort (cf.
Raz 1978). Similarly, it appears in the legislation that many prima facie rights can be overridden by what the court considers to be public interest considerations. Dworkin`s (1977) response to the latter type of criticism was to argue that, on closer inspection, the examination of opposition to the law can itself be seen as instantiating another common law. However, this depends on the controversial assertion that the only considerations on which the courts can legitimately rely are pre-existing rights. It was also objected that, as a general theory of the nature of rights, it might be self-destructive, since then any consideration could be considered to be based on law, which meant that rights did not have a particular role in practical argumentation. (For a discussion of Dworkin`s theory, including its other formulations, see Yowell 2007.) Ownership and | Rights | Rights: | of man Rights: children Another particular type of legal claim or legal group that is increasingly respected by theorists is that of property rights. The discussion about this belongs more to that of the property itself – see the entry on the property. Only a few brief remarks are made here.
As a rule, the remedies themselves include other remedies, such as the imposition of a court decision, possibly under penalty of a criminal or quasi-criminal sanction, or the freezing or confiscation of a person`s property if, for example, someone has not paid damages previously awarded by the court. The details of these additional remedies vary from system to system. The purpose of this article is to examine legal rights and types of rights, but before considering the meaning and types of rights, it is very necessary to know the terms “evil” and “duty”, both of which are closely related to rights, and it is desirable to refer to them before considering the important issue of legal rights. This article is very important because each branch of law such as contracts, tort, crime and family consists of rules and these rules create rights and obligations. In the course of the administration of justice, these rights and obligations are therefore applied by the State. Therefore, it is very important to know the definition of rights, injustices and legal obligations. A related, more controversial point is whether, unlike civil law, criminal law confers legal rights on the citizens it protects. The Orthodox view is that this is not the case, although there may be parallel citizenship. Let us take the case of someone who is unjustly attacked. In most jurisdictions, it is both a felony and a misdemeanor. Civil law clearly provides a right of recourse, for example to bring an action for damages.
However, given that in most jurisdictions it is mainly (and sometimes exclusively) the State that decides whether or not to prosecute for the criminal aspect, the most common view is that the citizen does not have a legal right corresponding to the criminal aspect. More recent versions, such as those by Raz (1984a, 1984b), take a completely different approach. In their view, the assertion that X is the holder of rights means that its interests or any aspect thereof constitute sufficient grounds for imposing obligations on others, either not to interfere with X in the performance of an act or to secure it in something.